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Abstract: 
Foreign military bases are the important means for power projection. Particularly in Africa, 
French military bases are the symbol of its sphere of influence, which have been strengthening 
France’s protection of its economic, political, cultural, overseas national and security interests. 
The bases are of great significance to enhance French intervention capability, making it the 
most influential external power on African continent. After the Middle East upheaval in 2011, 
it is likely that France will come back to North Africa militarily and restore military presence in 
the region within a multilateral framework, so that its domestic Toulon military base, its 
military presence in North Africa, in Gabon, the Ivory Coast, Djibouti and in Abu Dhabi will be 
interconnected, entailing France a dominant player in the “Arc of Instability” which extends 
from West Africa to the Persian Gulf. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign military base (FMB) refers to an area on land or on sea beyond a sovereign state’s 
jurisdiction, which is stationed with a certain number of armed forces with military activities, 
organized institutions and military facilities (Harkavy, 2007: 2-9). It’s an important means for 
states to project power, interfere in regional affairs, spread culture, safeguard overseas interest 
and enhance political influence. Based on different criteria, foreign military bases can be put 
into different categories. For instance, according to difference of duration, they can be divided 
into permanent (with a long-term target)and ad hoc (with a short-term target) bases；based on 
difference of functions, they can be divided into army bases, air bases, naval bases, logistic 
bases, communication bases, arsenal bases, etc. As of 2011, the U.S. has established over 700 
military bases and installations in 38 sovereign states (38 foreign bases are large ones). Its total 
foreign bases are as many as that of Roman Empire in 117 A.D. and of British Empire in 1898 
when the two empires were at their respective heyday. Besides, currently Britain has foreign 
military bases in Cyprus, Ascension Islands, Kenya and Falkland Islands, etc., while Russia, 
Japan and India also boast foreign military bases to protect their respective vital interest. It 
seems that foreign military bases are universally taken advantage of by both traditional western 
powers and emerging powers.  
2. FRENCH FOREIGN MILITARY BASES IN ITS SECURITY STRATEGY 
Since modern times, France has been enjoying a status of “world power” with strong global 
influence, partly because it has deployed military bases over four continents—from the 
Caribbean Sea to South America, from Indochina to Oceania, and from the Pacific to the 
African continent. France was a geographically dispersed nation. For instance, French Guyana 
is 7000 kilometers away, Mayotte is 8000 kilometers away, and New Caledonia is 18300 
kilometers away (French Ministry of Defense, 2008: 188). However, the deployment of foreign 
military bases actually lessened French geographical disadvantage and shortened the distance. 
France’s military bases in foreign countries, colonies and trust territory made it a de facto 
global power. Since the end of the Cold War, French troops abroad totaled 50 thousand, and 
they can be categorized into three functions: the first are for peace-keeping mission within UN 
framework, such as in Lebanon; the second are for peacekeeping and military operations within 
the framework of NATO or EU, such as in Afghanistan; and the third are for foreign military 
bases, such as in Djibouti and Gabon. The first and second operational leadership is not in 
France’s hand, while the third one is (See table 1). 
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Table 1：French Foreign military Presence: Categories and Deployment（2008） 
Host 
Nations 
  Regions Troops Military Components Categories of 
Military Presence 
Djibouti Africa 2900  2 regiments; 1 transport aircraft; 10 
combat aircraft; 10 helicopters; 1 
maritime patrol aircraft 
Permanent 
military bases 
Gabon Africa 800 1 infantry battalion; 2 transport 
aircraft; 6 helicopters 
Permanent 
 military bases 
Senegal Africa 1150 1 infantry battalion; 1 transport 
aircraft; 1 maritime patrol aircraft; 1 
helicopter 
Permanent 
 military bases 
Chad Africa 1200 6 combat aircraft; 2 transport 
aircraft; 1 infantry company 
Temporary 
military bases 
Chad Africa 1550 1 support base; 
1 tactical group 
EU peacekeeping 
mission 
La  
Réunion 
Africa 4000 1 paratroop regiment; 2 frigates; 2 
patrol boats; 2 transport aircraft; 2 
helicopters; 1050 gendarmes; 1150 
SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
Gulf of 
Guinea 
Africa 100 Navy Temporary 
military bases 
Ivory Coast Africa 1850 Unknown Permanent 
military bases 
and UN 
peacekeeping 
mission 
Mayotte Africa 350 2 patrol boats; 1 infantry 
detachment; 300 gendarmes 
Permanent 
 military bases 
Maritime 
Presence in 
Indian 
Indian 
Ocean 
1250 Navy Temporary 
military bases 
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Ocean 
Bosnia and 
Kosovo 
Europe 2250 Unknown NATO 
peacekeeping 
mission 
Lebanon West Asia 1750 Unknown UN peacekeeping 
mission 
UAE West Asia 450 Unknown Permanent 
military bases 
Afghanistan Central 
Asia 
2300 Unknown NATO 
peacekeeping 
mission 
New- 
Caledonia 
Oceania 2950 1 infantry regiment; 1 frigate; 3 
patrol boats; 3 transport aircraft; 6 
helicopters; 900 gendarmes; 350 
SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
French 
Guyana 
South 
America 
3800 2 infantry regiments; 2 boats; 7 
helicopters; 800 gendarmes; 700 
SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
French 
Polynesia 
South 
America 
2400 1 infantry company; 1 frigate; 3 
maritime patrol aircraft; 2 transport 
aircraft; 2 helicopters; 540 
gendarmes; 250 SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
Martinique 
 
Caribbean 
Sea 
3200 1 infantry regiment; 1 frigate; 1 tug; 
3 transport aircraft; 3 helicopters; 
550 gendarmes; 550 SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
Guadeloupe 
 
Caribbean 
Sea 
1000 1 infantry battalion; 1 patrol boat; 1 
helicopter; 800 gendarmes; 550 
SMA 
Permanent 
military bases 
Source: Ministry of Defense, The French White Paper on Defense and National Security, New York: Odile 
Jacob Publishing Corporation, 2008, p. 150. 
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3. FRENCH AFRICAN MILITARY BASES IN EVOLUTION 
Charles Pasqua, former French Interior Minister, said, “European security strategy relies on 
three rings, namely, the Mediterranean, European continent and the Atlantic. France is the only 
country that could play an active part in all the three rings (Keiger, 2001: 227).” From mid 19th 
century to the end of the Cold War, Africa had been consistently regarded as the “backyard” 
and “sphere of influence” of France; the Mediterranean had been seen as the “inner lake” 
instead of its “border”, which connected France’s homeland in north with the African colonies 
in south, and both territories were regarded as inseparable parts of French Empire. According to 
the logic, France is an empire standing on two continents of Europe and Africa, and “the 
Mediterranean Sea flows across France just as La Seine flows across Paris (Andrew and 
Kanya-Forstner, 1981: 250).” This has deeply rooted in French conscience. For instance, On 
February 3, 2000, François Bujon de l'Estang, French Ambassador to the U.S. delivered a 
speech in U.S. National War College. He openly called the Mediterranean-Africa-Middle East 
regions France’s “backyard,” which is of vital importance to the state (Oleynik, 2001: 165).  
Africa is the backbone of French Empire. By the time the Department of Colony was founded 
in 1894, France’s colonial territory ranked the second in the world, next only to Britain’s. 
After Morocco became its protectorate in 1912，French colonial territory expanded to 10 
million square kilometers, including 750-thousand-square-kilometer colony in Indochina, 
Madagascar as well as tiny islands on the Pacific and Indian Ocean (Andrew and Kanya-
Forstner, 1981: 9). At the eve of the outbreak of World War Two (WWII), French colony was 
11.75 million square kilometers with a colonial population of 41.1 million, mostly in Africa 
(Maclean and Szarka, 2008: 7). In early 1940s, about half Africa was under its rule; after WWII 
ended in 1945 France restored its huge colony of 12 million square kilometers with a colonial 
population of 65 million. Among them, France had 21 colonies in Africa, covering 10.39 
million square kilometers, making up 37% of its general colonial territory, and 24.5% of its 
colonial population (Baycroft, 2008: 147). 
Why do the French have a strong sentiment towards Africa in the past two centuries? And why 
are France-Africa relations so special? Before answering the questions, it is necessary to notice 
that since modern times, France was frequently defeated by its European rivals, especially 
Britain and Germany, making it a disputable power in Europe. For instance, France failed in the 
war with Prussia in 1870 and was humiliated again in WWII by Germany. To recover from that, 
France was determined to expand its colonies and increase military presence abroad to make up 
for its disadvantages in neighborhood. To achieve rejuvenation, France strove to integrate its 
homeland, départements d'Outre-Mer, colonies and Trust territory, and wished to constitute a 
virtual empire—“the French Union”, which was comparable with the Soviet Union in terms of 
territorial influence. African continent is an area with the most concentrating overseas interest 
of France and is also the backbone of the virtual “French Union”. It was French government’s 
enduring task to exclude other powers from the region, prevent them from interfering into 
African affairs and meet the challenge of decolonization from the inside.  
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The deployment of foreign military bases is one of French key endeavors to achieve that goal. 
Since the end of WWII, France established four war zones of North, West and Central Africa as 
well as Southern Indian Ocean, and deployed several dozen military bases. France took every 
measure to suppress nationalists who advocated self-determination. On May 8, 1945, a large-
scale anti-France demonstration swept Algeria, which was finally cracked down by French 
troops, and the casualty was over 45 thousand. The Algerian demonstration and the subsequent 
tough suppression caused a chain reaction. Three days later, a general strike happened in Syria, 
and French forces raid Damascus for three successive days, which caused a serious casualty too. 
In 1946, the Fourth Republic of France was founded, which highlighted that the new Republic 
was composed of three parts, French homeland, Départements d'Outre-Mer, and other foreign 
territories (Keiger, 2001: 207-208). Gaston Monnerville, former French head of Senate said at 
France’s congress that, “Without overseas territory, today’s France would decline to be a lesser 
power needing to be liberated instead of the winner of WWII”; the Former President François 
Mitterrand also said, “Without Africa, there would be no history of France in the 21st century 
(Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 1981: 250).” 
Before the decolonization of Africa reached its climax in 1960s, France had over 90 legions 
with 60 thousand troops and several dozen military bases on the continent (Zhang, 1987: 37). 
France’s security strategy relied on three rings of NATO, United Europe and military bases in 
Africa in that period. 
After the founding of the French Fifth Republic, President Charles de Gaulle was determined to 
make France the third world power after the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and he was convinced that 
France would be the spokesperson of the third world. To achieve that status, Africa was of 
great significance. Africa to France is like Latin America to U.S. and East Europe to the Soviet 
Union. As to French interest in North Africa, de Gaulle underlined that the Mediterranean Sea 
should be the Sea of the neighboring countries, not the American or the Soviet “inner lake.” 
Despite the sweet words, the African nationalists failed to echo de Gaulle. Instead, they 
regarded French military bases in Africa as the remnant of western colonial rule, compelling 
Paris to close some of the unimportant bases. As a result, from 1962 to 1964, French troops in 
Africa declined from 59 thousand to 21 thousand, but the conviction that “Africa is France’s 
backyard” remained unchanged. After the successive independences of French colonies on the 
continent, France struggled to maintain military cooperation with the newly independent states, 
and signed new military defense treaties with all the new countries (excluding Algeria) with the 
name of preventing communist penetration and keeping African internal security. From 1960 to 
1994, France updated defense pacts with 27 African nations, which laid a legal foundation for 
the continuous deployment of French military bases (Charbonneau, 2008: 61). In 1970s and 
1980s, France deployed bases in over 20 African states, and the host nations represented 40% 
of the continent’s territory, so that France remained the most influential external power among 
the youngest countries.  
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Table 2：French Military Defense Treaties with African Countries 
Partners Year Partners Year 
Benin 1975 Malawi 1980 
Burkina Faso 1961 Mali 1985 
Burundi 1969 Mauritius 1979 
Cameron 1974 Mauritania 1986 
Central Africa 1960 Morocco 1994 
Chad 1976 Nigeria 1977 
Comoros 1978 Rwanda 1975 
Congo(Brazzaville) 1974 Senegal 1974 
Congo(Kinshasa) 1974 Seychelles 1979 
Djibouti 1977 Togo 1963 
Equatorial Guinea 1985 Tunisia 1973 
Gabon 1960 Zimbabwe 1992 
Guinea 1985 Madagascar 1966 
Ivory Coast 1961   
Source: Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
Burlington, VT and Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2008, p. 62. 
Based on Table 2, a conclusion can be drawn that military base deployment is by no means an 
isolated event, and it reflects the host nation and the user nation’s military, political, economic 
and cultural relations. Defense pacts not only can legitimize base deployment, but also can 
guarantee French privilege in Africa, such as the right to fly over ally’s territory, to rent its 
seaports and airports, to use the forward military facilities, and to host joint military rehearsals. 
Besides, in early 1970s, French military officers acted as consultants and trained a huge number 
of local police and special force (Corbett, 1972: 155-157). French military bases in Africa also 
became an important bridgehead to project its military power.  
French military bases also have political implications, such as to show flags and to symbolize 
France’s world power status. The bases are the crystallization of French national dignity and 
resolve. As President Charles de Gaulle put it, “if France falls into a second-rank country, it 
would no longer exist.” To secure its world power status, France has consistently restructured 
its military bases in Africa to meet new challenges. For instance, in 1970s, its base deployment 
mode is a “cross”.  The horizontal axis connected Dakar of Senegal, N’Djamena of Chad and 
Djibouti in Horn of Africa; the vertical axis linked Algiers of Algeria, N’Djamena of Chad and 
Brazzaville of Congo with N’Djamena as the converging point. Later on, due to turbulence in 
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Congo, France’s military bases in Brazzaville were moved to Libreville, Gabon; its N’Djamena 
military bases were moved to Bouar, Central Africa, but French “cross-shape” deployment 
mode remained unchanged. The total number of troops in Africa was around 80 thousand, so 
that they could reach any regions within 24 hours when crisis erupted (Zhu and Xu, 1988: 13-
14). In early 1970s, the number of deployed troops increased to 108 thousand, and they were 
mostly concentrated in Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Senegal, and Madagascar, etc. （See table 3）. 
Table 3：French Troops in Black Africa in 1970s 
Host Nations Troops Host Nations Troops 
Djibouti 3800 Madagascar 2000 
Ivory Coast 450 Chad 800 
Gabon 450 Senegal 2300 
Niger 450 Others 550 
Total 10800 
Source: Edward M. Corbett, The French Presence in Black Africa, Washington D.C.: Black Orpheus Press, 1972, 
pp. 146-147.  
In 1981 when François Mitterrand took presidency, France placed greater emphasis on relations 
with the third world and opposed both U.S. and Soviet to encroach Africa. French “cross-
shape” base structure, however, had totally collapsed due to the fierce torrent of decolonization. 
To guarantee France’s southern flank security, Mitterrand proposed to rely on four pillars of 
permanent military bases in Africa, i.e. Senegal, Central Africa, Gabon and Djibouti. 
Meanwhile, France maintained flexible military presence in Cameron and Ivory Coast to 
reestablish a new framework. In mid 1980s, the primary rival of France in Africa was 
apparently the Soviet Union, who expanded its military presence in Yemen, Somalia, Ethiopia, 
Libya, Angola, Algeria, etc in a step-by-step manner. About 4/5 of Soviet warring ships in the 
Indian Ocean were deployed near Aden (Yuan, 1979: 26). To balance Soviet influence and 
prevent its penetration into black Africa, Mitterrand administration restored part of its military 
bases in Africa and the deployed troops rebounded to eight thousand. Among the top ten 
France’s foreign military bases, three were located in Africa: Djibouti, Senegal and Gabon, 
revealing French strong resolve to deter “communist penetration into Africa (Charbonneau, 
2008: 65)”. Besides, France strengthened its control of francophone Africa by other means, 
such as political persuasion, trade concession, economic aid and cultural influence; France also 
made great efforts to train the host nations’ military and police forces, and as many as 1900 
African officers received training in 1980s (Staniland, 1987: 55-56). Geopolitically, French 
military bases echoed American and British military bases in Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, 
and the three countries actually encircled the Soviet military presence in the Horn of Africa and 
the West Indian Ocean. 
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4. FRENCH MILITARY BASE REDEPLOYMENT IN AFRICA SINCE THE 
END OF THE COLD WAR 
Since the end of the Cold War, weak Russia inherited most of Soviet Union’s legacy, but had to 
close all military bases beyond Eurasian continent, such as the ones in Cuba, Ethiopia, Angola 
and Mozambique, leaving France unchallenged in Africa. Yet, due to fiscal problems, France 
was confronted with serious economic slowdown at home. In early 1990s, there were over 2.8 
million unemployed workers and 400 thousand homeless residents in France. In 1992-1993, 
French unemployment rate reached a historical record, and as many as 3 million were jobless 
(Kedward, 2006: 544). Economic depression forced Paris to reduce its military bases in Africa. 
In 1994, according to the military treaties signed after the summit of francophone countries, 
France reserved its military bases only in seven francophone countries, i.e. Cameron, Bangui of 
Central Africa, N'Djamena of Chad, Djibouti, Libreville of Gabon, Bouet of Ivory Coast and 
Dakar of Senegal (Riding, 2009: 8). As of 1994, 8500 French troops were deployed with 1.2 
thousand extra military consultants in Africa (Keiger, 2001: 228). 
In February 1994, French Department of Defense issued a White Paper, claiming that, the 
future threat to France would be more unpredictable, disperse, complex and multi-faceted, so 
France would, on the one hand promote democratization of African regimes; on the other hand, 
it would reduce military presence there (Gregory, 2000: 435). 
The White Paper exerted a far-reaching effect on France’s African military bases. After taking 
presidency in May 1995, Jacques René Chirac declared that France’s total armed forces would 
be reduced from 573 thousand to 440 thousand by the end of 2002, a drop of 23% (Chafer, 
2008: 45). In 1995, 23 African francophone countries had military cooperation treaties with 
France, but only six were still stationed with French permanent military bases: Cameron (10), 
Djibouti (3500), Gabon (610), Ivory Coast (580), Republic of Central Africa (1500) and 
Senegal (1300). Besides, Chad had a flexible French military base with 850 troops (Gregory, 
2000: 438). 
In 1996, the new defense report（Une Défense Nouvelle）came into being, and the report 
reiterated Chirac’s new idea，which put French security strategy into three categories: 
protecting the vital interests of territorial integrity, sovereignty, physical and property security 
of French nationals; protecting France’s strategic interest in the Mediterranean region; and 
protecting France’s interest as a world power (Rynning, 2000: 63; He, 2007: 135-136). 
Later on, France carried out the “Millon Initiative”, which was named after Charles Millon, 
French Defense Minister (1995-1997). According to the Initiative, France would reduce its 
troops in Africa by 40% in the following six years, namely from 8350 to 5000; one of the six 
permanent military bases in the continent would be closed, and each of the rest bases would be 
equipped with more advanced army, navy and air forces as well as gendarmes, and each would 
have an average troops of around 1000. The new bases would be more flexible, small-scaled 
and efficient. After the Initiative was implemented, French troops in Chad decreased from 840 
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to 550; the troops in Gabon dropped from 600 to 550; the troops in Djibouti were reduced from 
3250 to 2800; the troops in Ivory Coast shrank from 580 to 550; and the troops in Senegal 
diminished from 1300 to 1100 (La France Sonne la Retraite à Bangui, 1997; Gregory, 2000: 
438; Shi and Ren, 1998: 63-64). After readjustment, French military presence in Africa 
concentrated on some key positions, which enhanced its capability in action, defense and 
response at a lower economic cost. Thanks to the Initiative, about $ 30 million (4.9%) of 
French military expenditure was cut, which was used for training the local African armed 
forces and police. Through the Initiative, the African counterpart was able to shoulder more 
obligations than before, and France’s involvement in African conflict was lessened (Keiger, 
2001: 229).  
Entering the 21st century, African countries were basically stable, so French military bases 
have functionally evolved from intervention into regional affairs to tackling non-traditional 
threat, such as combating terrorism and preventing WMD. In 2001, there were about 30 
thousand French troop abroad working on different tasks, and 5500 were in Africa. Since then, 
France had to participate in new military campaign in Afghanistan and later on in Iraq within 
the framework of NATO (“Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom”) 
(Chafer, 2008: 44-45). Accordingly, French troops in Africa dropped to 5300, and its bases in 
Cameron and Central Africa were closed, while Chad, Djibouti, Gabon, Ivory Coast and 
Senegal continued to host French facilities (Utley, 2002: 134-137). However, the reduction of 
French force did not mean that Paris would disengage from the continent. On the contrary, 
France would like to have a smaller but stronger force with higher efficacy. As Defense 
Minister Charles Millon put it, despite the reduction of French force, France would reconfirm 
its commitment to defense pacts with francophone countries (Zhao, 1999: 31). 
5. THE DYNAMICS OF FRENCH DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY BASES 
IN AFRICA 
Since the end of WWII, despite the side effect of African decolonization, most of French 
military bases survived. They were not only the legacy of French colonial rule, but also the 
crystallization of Paris’ special ties with francophone countries. These military bases aimed at 
protecting France’s five-layer interests.  
The first layer is France’s economic interest. Geographically, although France looks over the 
sea on three sides, it’s cornered by Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain in Europe. Thanks to its 
global military bases, France boasted a huge exclusive economic zone of over 11 million square 
kilometers, second only to that of U.S. (French Ministry of Defense, 2008: 57). At the eve of 
WWII, French investment in the colonial regions made up 50% of its overseas investment, and 
27.2% of its foreign trade. France’s trade volume with North Africa, Syria and Lebanon 
reached 15 billon francs then (Andrew and Kanya-Forstner, 1981: 238). In the early 21st 
century, although France-African trade made up only 5% of France’s total trade volume, Africa 
remained an undisputable huge continent for it has one billion people, a big potential market, 
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and there exists a great complimentarity of trade between the two sides (Utley, 2002: 130). 
From 1991 to 2008, Paris remained the largest trading partner of Africa with an astonishing 
trade surplus of 32 billion francs (Zhao, 1999: 34).  The 2008 White Paper of France 
highlighted that, “France and Europe cannot turn their backs on the continent closest to them. 
Africa possesses numerous strengths and has a considerable human and economic potential. In 
the long term, these capacities could enable it to play a leading role in global economic growth 
and security (French Ministry of Defense, 2008: 43). ” In June 2010, the 25th summit of 
Francophone countries was held in Nice, France, and about 230 French companies and African 
trade organizations attended the conference. President Nicolas Sarkozy promised at the 
conference to promote economic and trade cooperation with his African counterpart, and would 
help some African countries obtain the membership of G20 and UNSC (Marquand and Baldauf, 
2010). 
The second layer is France’s cultural interest. There is a popular aphorism in France which says 
that “Portuguese tended to build churches in colony; British tended to set up trading centers in 
colony; while the French tended to run schools in colony (Williams, 1968: 72).” French 
military bases in Africa play an important role in popularizing French language and culture as 
well as expanding its cultural influence, particularly in francophone countries of Ivory Coast, 
Rwanda, Central Africa, Chad, Sierra Leone, Cameron, Djibouti, etc. France not only 
strengthened its political control, but also enabled French language to be their official language. 
As of early 21st century, there were about 105 million people who took French as mother 
tongue, and there were 55 million more people who frequently use the language. The 
francophone summit is an important symbol of France’s cultural influence, and the first summit 
was held in Paris in November 1973. Currently, it has over 50 member states, including 15 
members in West Asia and Africa, and French government has dispatched over 6000 language 
teachers to Africa in the past two decades (Covarrubias and Tom Lansford, 2007: 30; Oleynik, 
2001: 82).  
The third layer is France’s political interest. In the process of colonization, French colonists 
believed that they enjoyed a moral high ground, and even held a strong conviction that western 
values were universally acceptable. They regarded themselves as “mothers” and “tutors” to 
spread advanced civilization to barbaric Africa. On July 28, 1885, French Prime Minister Jules 
Ferry said, “the superior nations have ultimate rights to conquer the inferior ones, and 
meanwhile bear responsibility to transmit civilization (Keiger, 2001: 202).” The so-called 
“civilization” refers to mostly French political values. President François Mitterrand pointed 
out that, “In the 21st century, the fate of France hinges on the special ties with former colonial 
countries. Without Africa, there would be no history of France to speak of in the new century 
(Maclean and Joseph Szarka, 2008: 12-13).” Since WWII, particularly during Mitterrand 
presidency, France’s “value diplomacy” was an important part of its African strategy，and 
its African military bases helped topple several autocratic regimes in Africa, such as in the 
Republic of Central Africa. In 1990, Mitterrand advocated to resorting to “stick and carrot” 
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policy towards authoritarian African states, and reiterated that French aid to these countries 
would be conditioned with free election, free media, multi-party alternation of power, judicial 
justice and democratization (Védrine and Moisi, 2000: 88). In March 2011, France initiated 
Odyssey Dawn Operation with Britain and other allies to overthrow Kaddafi regime in Libya; 
in April 2011, President Nicolas Sarkozy declared that France would participate UN military 
operation in Ivory Coast to disarm former President Laurent Gbagbo, and thereafter French 
troops increased to 1500 in the country. The two military operations were both under the 
banner of “anti-dictatorship” and “promoting democracy”, reflecting French political interest in 
Africa.  
The fourth layer is French national’s interest. Before WWI broke out, there were 855 thousand 
French nationals abroad and about 600 thousand were in Algeria; since the end of the Cold War, 
there were 200 thousand French nationals in Africa, and 60% were in francophone countries 
(Zhang, 1993: 32). As of 2008, French nationals in Africa were 240 thousand, representing 
16% of the total number abroad, which is an integral part of France’s national interest (Hansen, 
The French Military in Africa; Keiger, 2001: 11, 202). Undoubtedly, French troops regarded it 
as their primary task to ensure physical and property security of these nationals. In November 
2004, French peacekeeping force in Ivory Coast was attacked by local rioters, French nationals’ 
properties were looted and French schools were burned. Within several days, nine French 
soldiers were killed, two nationals were missing and over 30 nationals were injured. As 
response, France dispatched 700 more troops to assist the 4000 French soldiers that have 
already been deployed there. The enforced French troops then cracked down a sweeping anti-
France demonstration, killing 67, and injuring 1256 local demonstrators (Chafer, 2008: 48). 
Although such military operation is politically problematic, it effectively protected French 
nationals’ security and interest in the country. As President François Mitterrand put it, “If 
France abandoned its presence in Africa, our nation would be incomplete in the eyes of 
international community (Jiang, 1996: 18-19).” 
Table 4: French Military Intervention to African Arab Countries，1954-2011 
Target Code of 
Operation 
Date of Beginning Date of 
Ending 
Troops 
implemented 
Algeria Algerian War October 1, 1954 July 1, 1962 80 thousand to 400 
thousand 
Egypt Mousquetaire October 30, 1956 November 
24, 1956 
30 thousand 
Mauritania Ecouvillon February 10, 1958 May 5, 1959 Unknown 
Tunisia Charrue courte July 17, 1961 July 23, 
1961 
Unknown 
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Tunisia Secours Tunisie October 11, 1969 November 
3, 1969 
Unknown 
Djibouti Saphir 2 April 1977 December 
1977 
Unknown 
Tunisia Scorpion January 27, 1980 March 3, 
1980 
Unknown 
Somalia Myrtille May 1981 May 1981 Unknown 
Libya Mirmillon September 1984 November 
1984 
4000 
Tunisia Hortensia April 1986 April 1986 Unknown 
Comoro Oside December 4, 1989 December 
20, 1989 
1500 
Somalia Bérénice January 3, 1991 January 9, 
1991 
500 
Mauritania MINURSO October 1991 Ongoing 25 
Djibouti Iskoutir February 25, 1992 June 1999 120 
Somalia Sanaa November 15, 1992 November 
18, 1992 
Unknown 
Somalia Restoring Hope December 7, 1992 April 12, 
1993 
2400 
Somalia ONUSOM2 April 12, 1993 December 
15, 1993 
100 
Algeria Caravane 1994 1994 Unknown 
Somalia United Shiled January 1995 March 1995 Unknown 
Comoro Azalée 1 September 30, 1995 October 8, 
1995 
1070 
Comoro Azalée 2 October 15, 1995 March 23, 
1996 
Unknown 
Algeria Algérie November 1996 2003 129 
Djibouti Khor angar January 24, 1999 February 490 
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28, 2001 
Djibouti Ardoukoba June 1999 2000 Unknown 
Libya Dawn Odyssey March 19, 2011 Ongoing Unknown 
Source: Bruno Charbonneau, France and the New Imperialism: Security Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, Burlington, 
VT and Hampshire, England: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 68-72. 
The fifth layer is French security interest. French military bases in Africa enabled the country 
to engage in military diplomacy, increase the share of arms sales, interfere in the local security 
affairs and participate in African peacekeeping operations. From 1962 to 1995, France initiated 
as many as 19 military operations in African Arab countries alone (Hansen, The French 
Military in Africa). As to the principles of intervention, former President Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing emphasized that, “First, France honors its commitment to allies’ security based on the 
defense pacts; second, France only intervenes when being requested by the local friendly 
governments; and third, French intervention is defensive instead of offensive, and it aimed at 
guaranteeing security instead of sabotaging stability (Zhang and Zhou, 1993: 389).” 
To protect the above-mentioned five-layer interests, France endeavored to maintain military 
bases on the former colonial land, and made every effort to consolidate them, such as economic 
aid, trade concession, cultural attraction and political intimidation.  
To most of the poor African nations, foreign military bases are politically sensitive, but 
economically rewarding. Despite sporadic politicalization of these military bases, French troops 
in Africa do bring a handsome fiscal revenue for the host nations. For instance, in 1960s, 
French government offered the host nations about $ 35 million per year as compensation; the 
30 thousand troops there spent about $ 100 million each year, which provided thousands of jobs 
related with bars, restaurants, supermarkets, entertainment and gym centers. With the shrinking 
size of these military bases, France’s expenditure on African bases dropped to $ 25 million in 
early 21st century, but that’s still attractive to local African governments (Corbett, 1972: 153). 
6. CONCLUSION 
Since early 2011, following “Jasmine Revolution” in North Africa, Western powers have gone 
to great length to interfere in African security affairs. Particularly after the UNSC passed 
Resolution 1973 on Libyan situation, France has taken initiative to help Libyan opposition 
parties overthrow Kaddafi regime. There seem to be four reasons for President Nicolas Sarkozy 
to passionately participate in Libya War: to consolidate EU leadership in African affairs, to 
monopolize the West control of Libyan oil resources, to secure a moral high ground of 
promoting democracy in North Africa, and to win popular support at home for reelection in 
2012. With the turbulence of North African situation,, particularly with the downfall of Kaddafi 
regime, Sarkozy will probably readjust base deployment in Africa in the future.  
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First, it’s likely that France would further cut its traditional military bases. French military 
bases in Africa are by nature an extension of its colonial rue in 19th and 20th century. Since 
France’s national interest is dynamic instead of static, shifting instead of fixed, these bases can 
hardly meet the need of the changed situation and interest. Since 2008, some of African 
countries hope Paris could honor its promise to “build new partnership with African nations” 
and “close the rest of military bases” on the continent. For instance, in February 2010, France 
had to close its permanent military bases in Senegal, and only Gabon and Djibouti are still 
hosting French permanent bases. It can be estimated that, since France’s vital interest region is 
shifting from West Africa to North Africa, it may reduce the military presence in Ivory Coast 
and Gabon, and increase its presence in North Africa. Tunisia, Morocco and post-Kaddafi 
Libya are three potential countries that could accept French military presence.  
Second, France may break the barrier of “Francophone Zone” and welcome other western 
partners to participate in African affairs. In the past two centuries, France has regarded Africa 
as its “backyard” and opposed any powers to penetrate into it, including the U.S. the former 
Soviet Union and China. After the outbreak of financial crisis in 2008, France’s influence in the 
continent faded away, so did the idea of “backyard”. France is now more open-minded and 
more tolerant to other powers in Africa. For instance, in recent years, France welcomed U.S. 
and Japan to open new military bases in Djibouti, and the three nations have shared the military 
facilities in the horn of Africa. Sarkozy administration has also welcomed UN, EU and NATO 
to participate in peacekeeping mission in Chad, Ivory Coast, Central Africa, etc. Meanwhile, 
Paris has broken the fence of “francophone” and “non-francophone” countries. For instance, 
recently, Paris expanded its strategic relationship with South Africa, which belongs to British 
Commonwealth; France launched Dawn Odyssey Mission against Kaddafi’s Libya, which was 
originally Italian sphere of influence.  
Finally, France may redeploy its military bases according to its new concept of “Arc of Crisis”. 
The 2008 French White Paper points out, “This region is not a homogenous ensemble. Each 
country in it has its own identity and history, and its political, social, economic and human 
wellsprings. Each part of the region has its own logic: that of the Sahel area, from Mauritania to 
Somalia, is clearly different from the Mediterranean littoral, the Near East, the Arabian-Persian 
Gulf, or from Afghanistan and Pakistan. But essential changes now taking place are modifying 
the security situation for France and Europe in this part of the world, which lies in Europe’s 
neighborhood and is central to global security strategic interests. The upsurge in radical Islam, 
the antagonism between Sunni and Shiite Muslims, the Kurdish question, and the fragility of 
political regimes in the region, form an explosive mixture (French Department of Defense, 
2008: 41).” To better protect its essential interest in the greater “Arc of Crisis”, France 
launched new military bases in Abu Dhabi, UAE in 2009 following Sarkozy’s visit to the Gulf.  
To sum up, after the North African upheaval in 2011, it is likely that France will return to North 
Africa militarily and establish military presence within a multilateral framework, so that its 
domestic Toulon military base, military presence in North Africa, in Gabon, Ivory Coast, 
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Djibouti and Abu Dhabi, UAE will be interconnected, and France may secure a dominant 
position in “Arc of Crisis” ranging from West and North Africa to the Persian Gulf.   
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